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Foreign policy experts and policy analysts are
misreading the lessons of Iraq. The emerging
conventional wisdom holds that success could
have been achieved in Iraq with more troops,
more cooperation among U.S. government agen-
cies, and better counterinsurgency doctrine. To
analysts who share these views, Iraq is not an
example of what not to do but of how not to do
it. Their policy proposals aim to reform the
national security bureaucracy so that we will get
it right the next time.
The near-consensus view is wrong and danger-
ous. What Iraq demonstrates is a need for a new
national security strategy, not better tactics and
tools to serve the current one. By insisting that
Iraq was ours to remake were it not for the Bush
administration’s mismanagement, we ignore the
limits on our power that the war exposes and in
the process risk repeating our mistake.
The popular contention that the Bush ad-
ministration’s failures and errors in judgment
can be attributed to poor planning is also false.
There was ample planning for the war, but it con-
flicted with the Bush administration’s expecta-
tions. To the extent that planning failed, there-
fore, the lesson to draw is not that the United
States national security establishment needs bet-
ter planning, but that it needs better leaders.
That problem is solved by elections, not bureau-
cratic tinkering.
The military gives us the power to conquer
foreign countries, but not the power to run
them. Because there are few good reasons to take
on missions meant to resuscitate failed govern-
ments, terrorism notwithstanding, the most
important lesson from the war in Iraq should be
a newfound appreciation for the limits of our
power. 
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Introduction
There is a strange consensus developing
among American foreign policy experts about
the war in Iraq. Most agree that the war will
not have been worthwhile, whatever precari-
ous success American forces can still achieve.
Despite that failure, foreign policy experts in
both parties mostly agree that with better
planning, more troops, better counterinsur-
gency doctrine, and more cooperation among
U.S. government agencies, Iraq could have
been stabilized.1 The experts fear, however,
that Iraq will sour Americans on future inter-
ventions—that an “Iraq syndrome” will pre-
vent the United States from embarking on
future state-building missions.2 To most
experts, this syndrome would be dangerous.
For even if Iraq is lost, the consensus view says,
the war on terrorism will require the United
States to repair failed states, lest they spawn
terrorism. 
To analysts who share these views, Iraq is
not an example of what not to do but of how
not to do it. It is an experiment that teaches
Americans lessons about how to manage for-
eign populations. Based in part on these
lessons, Washington is reforming the national
security bureaucracy to make it a better servant
of a strategy that requires military occupations,
state-building, and counterinsurgency opera-
tions—what the military calls reconstruction
and stabilization.3
To that end, the president and Congress
recently agreed to expand the size of our
ground forces in the hope that our next inter-
vention will not fall short of troops. Think
tanks across the ideological spectrum busy
themselves with plans to improve the coordi-
nation of national security agencies for the
next occupation and to prepare diplomats, sol-
diers, and bureaucrats to staff it.4 A new state-
building office in the State Department draws
up plans for ordering various failed or unruly
states.5 An array of defense experts offer advice
on counterinsurgency doctrine and insist that
the military services embrace it.6 The services
say that they already have done so. Next time,
American leaders are saying, we will have a
national security bureaucracy capable of imple-
menting our policies; next time, in other words,
we will get it right.
The consensus is wrong and dangerous.
What Iraq demonstrates is a need for a new
national security strategy, not better tactics
and tools to serve the current one. By insist-
ing that there was a right way to remake Iraq,
we ignore the limits on our power that the
enterprise has exposed and we risk repeating
our mistake. Deposing Saddam Hussein was
relatively simple. Creating a new state to rule
Iraq was nearly impossible, at least at a rea-
sonable cost. What prevents stability in Iraq
is not American policy but the absence of a
political solution to the communal and sec-
tarian divisions there. Our invasion exposed
those rifts but their repair is beyond our
power. Maybe the United States can improve
its ability to manage occupations, but the
principal lesson Iraq teaches is to avoid them.
Not all state-building missions pose the chal-
lenges Iraq does, but most of these missions
are extremely costly, most of them fail, and
most of them corrode American power.
This paper shows that the conventional
explanations for why we have failed to achieve
our stated aims in Iraq nearly five years after
the war began—poor governmental planning
and coordination in preparing for the occupa-
tion, too few troops, and misconceived coun-
terinsurgency doctrine—cannot explain the
persistent violence in Iraq. We also discuss why
there are limits to what planning, coordina-
tion, and counterinsurgency doctrine can
accomplish in war. We conclude by noting
that because there are few good reasons to
take on missions meant to resuscitate failed
governments, terrorism notwithstanding, we
should not much lament these limits on
American power.
The Size of the 
Occupation Force
Perhaps the most common complaint
about the American occupation of Iraq is
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that it was undermanned. The idea is that the
U.S. military stripped Saddam Hussein’s
Baathist regime of its monopoly on force in
Iraq but failed to fill the resulting power vac-
uum, on account of a lack of troops and will-
ingness to police the country. The result was
anarchy. Iraq’s tribes and factions within its
various ethnic groups armed themselves and
became pseudo governments. Some attacked
American troops, and some attacked each
other. Disputes broke out over real estate,
and the prospect of being manhandled by
rival militias brought still more insecurity,
defensive arming and attacks meant to serve
as self-defense. Beset by violence, the state
collapsed, and the idea of a unified, multi-
ethnic country faded.
To avoid these outcomes, experts say, the
United States should have sent a far larger
occupation force than the 150,000 it had in
Iraq when Baghdad fell. A better plan would
have two or three times that number, at a ratio
of 20 security personnel per 1,000 of the pop-
ulation. Those figures come from a series of
studies published by the RAND Corporation,
which arrived at a rule-of-thumb for force
ratios needed to maintain order based on a
historical survey of past occupation efforts.7
Those ratios are consistent with Central
Command’s OPLAN 1003-98, the pre-2002
contingency plan for war with Iraq, which
called for 380,000 troops, and the now famous
suggestion from Army Chief of Staff Eric
Shinseki that “something on the order of sev-
eral hundred thousand soldiers” would have to
occupy Iraq.8 One army brief on reconstruc-
tion issues took account of the army’s experi-
ence in Bosnia and Kosovo and estimated that
a comparable mission in Iraq would require
approximately 470,000 troops.9 President
Bush’s National Security Council appears to
have come up with the highest number. A
memo drafted in Feb-ruary 2003 suggested
that, if historical precedent were followed,
500,000 troops would be needed to stabilize
and rebuild Iraq.10
The idea that high troop levels were essen-
tial to success in Iraq and other stability oper-
ations has an obvious policy implication:
build a bigger army and Marine Corps. To that
end, the president last year announced a plan
to expand the army by 65,000 soldiers and the
Marines by 27,000 over five years.11 The expan-
sion plan has the support of majorities in both
parties and is slated to become law with the
passage of the 2008 Defense Authorization
Bill.12 The expansion will take three to five
years to implement. Given this timeframe, it is
justified less by Iraq than by the notion that
fighting terrorism will require other occupa-
tion and state-building missions that require
large numbers of American ground forces. 
The idea that more troops could have saved
Iraq from violent discord is flawed on several
accounts. First, as David Hendrickson and
Robert Tucker argue in a paper prepared for
the U.S. Army War College, it would have been
difficult, if not impossible, for the United
States to keep several hundred thousand
troops in Iraq for long.13 Although the United
States could have mustered a force level of
400,000–500,000 troops temporarily, normal
rotation schedules would have required the
troops to return home after being deployed a
year or less. The nation would then have
lacked enough replacement forces to maintain
even close to the 130,000 it kept on hand for
most of the occupation of Iraq, unless it want-
ed to either prevent troops from rotating
home or rely heavily on National Guard and
Reserve units, both politically dicey proposi-
tions likely to damage morale. The more
troops sent in initially, the fewer can remain
indefinitely. In a conflict that lasts three or five
years, in a large country like Iraq, the United
States cannot maintain a ratio of one soldier
or marine for every 50 civilians, even with a sig-
nificantly larger military.14
The second and more fundamental prob-
lem with the idea that more boots on the
ground would have prevented Iraq’s insur-
gency is that the way troops are employed
matters more than their number.15 History
holds examples of small numbers of troops
pacifying large populations and large num-
bers of troops failing to pacify small popula-
tions.16 The 20 troops per 1,000 civilians ratio
for policing populations abroad is drawn in
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part from cases such as Bosnia, where the sides
accepted the settlement that the troops
enforced. There were no insurgents, unlike in
Iraq. The difference is between enforcing peace
and making it. 
Another theory of the insurgency says that
its cause was not disorder but disagreements
among Iraq’s factions about the governance of
Iraq and opposition to the presence of an occu-
pying force. Far from preventing violence, the
presence of American troops might have pro-
voked it. It is not as if the insurgency grew in
regions where troops were absent and peace
broke out where they were present. Something
closer to the opposite appears to have occurred.
The Iraqi insurgents themselves often point to
the presence of foreign occupiers as the princi-
pal motivation for their violence.17 If 130,000
American troops had little idea how to win the
loyalty of Iraq’s Sunnis, there is little reason to
believe that another 200,000 would have done
much better. 
Disbanding the Army and
De-Baathification
Beyond the too-few-troops argument, most
critics of the Bush administration’s conduct of
the occupation point to two other key deci-
sions—disbanding the army and de-Baathifi-
cation—as crucial missteps that empowered
the insurgency. These decisions, made at the
start of L. Paul Bremer’s tenure as head of the
Coalition Provisional Authority, deprived Iraq
of managers it needed to run its ministries and
government-controlled factories and the secu-
rity personnel it needed to help the Americans
keep order. More importantly, the orders
angered and impoverished Sunni elites and
soldiers—many of whom made particularly
skilled insurgents. 
These two decisions did not conform to
the original war plans. During the buildup to
war, the U.S. military anticipated that Iraqi
forces would be kept relatively intact. Gen.
John Abizaid, who would take over at Central
Command (CENTCOM) in the summer of
2003, recommended that a substantial Iraqi
army be established, including three interim
divisions to “take over internal security func-
tions as quickly as possible.” Although Paul
Wolfowitz expressed concern, he ultimately
endorsed Abizaid’s proposal, which was con-
sistent with White House plans.18
War planners also debated what to do with
the Baath Party. The State Department and
CIA, according to Washington Post reporter Rajiv
Chandrasekaran, advocated de-Saddamifica-
tion—“purging two classes of Baathists: those
who had committed crimes and those at the
very top of the command structure.”19 The
Department of Defense favored a broader
purge that would have prohibited rank-and-
file members from holding senior government
positions. The National Security Council
attempted to broker a compromise whereby
only the highest ranks of the Baath party,
about 1 percent of its total members, would be
removed from office. But Ahmed Chalabi and
other Iraqi National Congress officials “argued
passionately that a wholesale purge of the
Baath Party was necessary to demonstrate
America’s commitment to a new political order
in Iraq.”20
Bremer ultimately adopted the position of
Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress.
Under secretary of defense for policy Douglas
Feith’s office drafted a one-and-a-half-page
executive order, later shown to Wolfowitz and
Rumsfeld (but not Rice or Powell). Jay Garner,
the outgoing head of the Office of Recon-
struction and Humanitarian Assistance that
was being replaced by Bremer’s Coalition
Provisional Authority, first saw it on May 13.
He was aghast. The order was “too hard, too
harsh,” he told Bremer. Garner insisted that
they take the draft to Rumsfeld. Bremer
refused, and issued Coalition Provisional
Authority Order Number 1, “De-Baathifica-
tion of Iraq Society,” on May 16, 2003. The
order purged as many as 85,000 party mem-
bers from the Iraqi government.21
One week later, on May 23, Bremer enact-
ed CPA Order Number 2, “Dissolution of
Entities.” This act formally abolished several
groups, including “the Iraqi armed forces,
which accounted for 385,000 people; the
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staff of the Ministry of the Interior, which
amounted to a surprisingly high 285,000
people . . . and the presidential security units,
a force of some 50,000.”22
However unwise they now appear, both
orders were responses to the demands of
Iraq’s majority, not American whims.23 The
United States wanted to avoid the appearance
of reconstituting a Sunni regime in a country
filled with ethnic tension and where Shia and
Kurds constituted 80 percent of the popula-
tion. Former Bremer aide Dan Senor ex-
plained that “if we hadn’t [moved against the
Baath Party], there may have been severe retri-
bution against the Sunnis. And the Shia and
Kurds might not have cooperated with us.
Those symbolic steps were very important
early on.”24 Had the CPA adopted a different
course, retaining the army and allowing
senior Baathists to remain in power, we might
have seen a less severe Sunni insurgency and a
quicker and more powerful Shi’ite insur-
gency. 
Nor is it clear that a reconstituted army
would have been an effective fighting force.
Training and motivation in Saddam’s army
was uneven at best, and there is little evidence
that a reconstituted army would have been of
much use in pacifying internal unrest.25 The
afflictions that have plagued the new Iraqi
army—the absence of nationalism to rally
diverse troops around, low morale, and dis-
organization—would likely have hindered the
old. 
It may be that these decisions were crucial
to our subsequent failures in Iraq. A more
plausible theory, however, says that the Iraqi
state was in disrepair before the American
invasion and was held together only by the
terror of the dictator that we removed.
Saddam’s removal created a competition for
power that was likely to be settled by arms,
whatever subsequent decisions the occupy-
ing authorities made about the army and the
Baath. It is not the argument here that those
decisions were wise or that they did not aid in
the rise of the Sunni insurgency. The point is
that those decisions were not necessary con-
ditions for the insurgency to get its legs,
given the broad support it enjoyed, especially
among Iraq’s Sunni population. 
The Poor Planning Fallacy
Conventional wisdom says that the failures
and errors in judgment just mentioned, as well
as many others, can be attributed to poor
planning. Better plans would have meant a
larger invasion force, which would have pre-
vented central authority in Iraq from unravel-
ing. If it had been operating from better plans,
the CPA would not have pursued de-Baathifi-
cation so aggressively, and it would not have
let the Iraqi army collapse. It therefore would
not have had to rush to stand up a new army
and police force in 2003, forces that were
wholly unprepared to fight. And if success in
Iraq did call for the training of Iraqi troops, a
better plan would not have immediately
assigned their training to overwhelmed Na-
tional Guardsmen but to personnel in the reg-
ular army and Marine Corps. 
Adequate preparation would have helped
in other ways. The CPA staff would have been
larger and more competent (it was initially
staffed by inexperienced Republican Party
loyalists). The Bush administration would
have asked for more funds to rebuild Iraq’s
infrastructure, and the CPA would have
spent them more carefully. With better fore-
sight, the CPA would not have wasted time
trying to privatize Iraq’s economy overnight
rather than getting it on its feet. Had they
adhered to plans, the CPA would not have
formed the Iraqi Governing Council, a group
of 25 appointed leaders who helped Bremer
rule Iraq prior to nationwide elections. The
council not only underrepresented Sunnis
but reportedly used what resources it con-
trolled for patronage and theft, discrediting
the government and driving Iraqis into the
arms of militias.26
One popular explanation for why the
planning for the occupation failed, the story
goes, is that the government was uncoordi-
nated and that individual agencies were inca-
pable of working together; some go so far as
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to claim that the entire interagency process is
broken.27 Had the Department of Defense
listened to the Central Intelligence Agency
and State Department, it would have pre-
pared ORHA, CPA, and CENTCOM for cer-
tain contingencies and avoided those errors.
Had the National Security Council done its
job, coordination would have been forced on
the agencies. 
To many analysts, the lessons of these fail-
ures are clear: improve the American nation-
al security bureaucracy’s ability to plan, and
restructure it to heighten coordination. In
Washington, calls for fixing the interagency
process to manage stability operations are
practically chanted. Top military officers and
civilian officials, including former chairman
of the Joint Chiefs Peter Pace and current sec-
retary of defense Robert Gates, endorse inter-
agency reform.28 Think tanks have produced
various papers in the last three years that pro-
pose changes to the national security bureau-
cracy to structure the interaction of senior
national security officials in Washington,
facilitate planning in the relevant organiza-
tions, and ensure cooperation in the field.
The State Department has established the
Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction
and Stabilization (S/CRS) and given it the
lead in future state-building missions.29
The most prominent proposals come from
the Center for Strategic and International
Studies’ Beyond Goldwater-Nichols project.30 The
idea is that parochial behavior in federal agen-
cies and the military services is bad.
Goldwater-Nichols, legislation that brought
joint planning and operations to the Penta-
gon in 1986, should become the model for the
rest of the national security bureaucracy. 
CSIS’s report suggests establishing plan-
ning offices in the civilian agencies involved
in stabilization operations. It calls for annual
exercises in which officials practice coordina-
tion and proposes a joint national security
career path, modeled on the military’s, which
temporarily places civilians in other agen-
cies.31
The report also calls for a deputy assistant
for interagency strategies on the National
Security Council, and a new office beneath
this official to coordinate ongoing interagency
activities. It recommends biannual guidance
from the president to organize these affairs,
and a Quadrennial National Security Review
to guide the national security bureaucracy just
as the Quadrennial Defense Review supposed-
ly guides the Pentagon.32
These proposals are offered as responses to
failures in Iraq. They are needed, their advo-
cates say, to improve our performance in the
war against terrorists, which will entail con-
tinued counterinsurgency and stability opera-
tions.33 Some of the suggestions are reason-
able. However, they rely not only on faulty
premises about Iraq, but also on undue faith
in planning and coordination. 
Why Better Planning and Coordination
Wouldn’t Have Saved Iraq
The first problem with the logic that better
planning would have saved Iraq is that the
planning for the war was both plentiful and
reasonably prescient. The problem was the
willingness to use the plans. The story is well-
documented by James Fallows’ Blind into
Baghdad, Thomas Ricks’ Fiasco, Rajiv Chandra-
sekaran’s Imperial Life in the Emerald City, and
Bob Woodward’s Plan of Attack. To the extent
that planning failed, it was because of the Bush
administration’s expectations about the war
and what was needed to sell it. The administra-
tion did not entertain plans for a prolonged
occupation, and it saw exercises that envi-
sioned one as efforts to undermine the case for
war. The right conclusion is not that the
United States national security establishment
needs better planning, but that it needs better
leaders. That problem is solved by elections,
not bureaucratic tinkering.
Preparation for the war began around
Thanksgiving 2001, when President Bush
asked Gen. Tommy Franks, CENTCOM, to
refresh the plan for the invasion of Iraq. Plans
for what came after the invasion were far less
organized, with scarcely connected efforts
within the National Security Council, the U.S.
Agency for International Development, State,
and various parts of the Department of
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Defense. ORHA chief Jay Garner intended to
hand power to a sovereign Iraqi government
within 90 days of the invasion, but he was
quickly replaced by Bremer, who had a far
more ambitious agenda. With the White
House’s blessing, the CPA decided to trans-
form Iraq into a stable democracy complete
with Western political freedoms and a market
economy. The idea of a swift exit and transfer
of power disappeared.34
Once the Bush administration embarked on
this course, it might have relied on any number
of reports, including thousands of pages of doc-
uments on countless aspects of postwar stabi-
lization and reconstruction issues that had
been prepared prior to the war.35 Most notable
was the State Department’s Future of Iraq
Project, a large panel of Iraqi exiles, U.S. diplo-
mats, academics, and other specialists convened
to examine the potential problems of and pros-
pects for postwar Iraq. 
Critics of the project correctly note that it
did not produce a precise reconstruction
plan.36 What it produced was the nearly 1,000-
page long Future of Iraq Study. Although it
was not a step-by step-guide to stabilizing Iraq,
the report foresaw a number of problems that
would need to be taken up over the course of
the postwar stabilizations operations. Based
on this and other work, done both inside and
outside of the government, the Bush adminis-
tration, according to James Dobbins, “should
have anticipated that when the old regime col-
lapsed, there would be a period of disorder, a
vacuum of power. . . . They should have antici-
pated extremist elements would seek to fill this
vacuum of power.”37
The problem with the Future of Iraq
Project was less that it could not be imple-
mented than that it was ignored, like all other
plans that foresaw a complex occupation. The
reason it was ignored was that the Bush
administration assigned the task of managing
the occupation to the Department of Defense,
whose leaders did not want one. The State
Department launched the Future of Iraq
Project because of a belief that a war would
require a prolonged effort to rebuild a func-
tional state. The Office of the Secretary of
Defense and Secretary Rumsfeld, like many in
the administration, were adverse to state-
building and wanted the army out of Iraq in
months, come hell or high water.38 In Feb-
ruary 2003, Rumsfeld predicted that the war
“could last six days, six weeks. I doubt six
months.”39
Given the secretary’s preferences, it is not
surprising that OSD ignored its rivals when
the president gave it control of postwar plan-
ning in January 2003. Pentagon officials, for
instance, were told not to attend CIA war-
games, which explored the possibility of vio-
lent political conflict and chaos after Saddam’s
fall.40 Likewise, Rumsfeld, apparently following
orders from Vice President Cheney, forced Jay
Garner to prevent Thomas Warrick, who had
headed the Future of Iraq Project, from joining
ORHA in Kuwait.41
The CIA prepared two different estimates
pertaining to post-war conditions, one warn-
ing about what American occupation forces
were likely to encounter in Iraq, the other per-
taining to developments in the region. Both
of those estimates proved to be prescient, in
that they anticipated that the ethnic and sec-
tarian tensions in Iraq would make it difficult
to establish a liberal democracy there that
would then serve as a model for the region.
But when Paul Pillar, at the time the national
intelligence officer for the Near East and
South Asia, put those estimates to the presi-
dent and his senior advisers, one of the offi-
cials told Pillar: “You just don’t see the possi-
bilities; you are too negative.”42 “It was clear,”
Pillar explained, “that the Bush administra-
tion would frown on or ignore analysis that
called into question a decision to go to war
and welcome analysis that supported such a
decision.”43
Certainly the Pentagon’s occupation plan
required a great deal of wishful thinking. For
example, the Pentagon, and presumably the
president, believed that resistance would be
light and that a new liberal Iraqi leader could
be implanted without the need for a long-term
military presence. Notions about Iraqi unity
were equally fanciful. Indeed, the Bush admin-
istration and its supporters went out of their
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way to denigrate the idea that sectarian strife
was likely in Iraq should Saddam Hussein lose
power. In congressional testimony prior to the
start of the war, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul
Wolfowitz explained that the Pentagon’s post-
war requirements might seem low relative to
competing estimates offered by Eric Shinseki
and Ret. Army General Anthony Zinni, the for-
mer head of CENTCOM, because “there’s been
none of the record in Iraq of ethnic militias
fighting one another.”44 Weekly Standard editor
Bill Kristol dismissed the notion “that the Shi’a
can’t get along with the Sunni and the Shi’a in
Iraq just want to establish some kind of Islamic
fundamentalist regime. There’s almost no evi-
dence of that at all.”45 Along similar lines,
Richard Perle, appearing on the Fox News pro-
gram Hannity and Colmes, told viewers “I don’t
believe you will get civil war. . . . There are dif-
ferences, to be sure, among these groups, but
it’s not like Bosnia. It’s not as if they have been
destroying each other for many years. They
haven’t, and I don’t believe that they will.”46
Insufficient planning did not create these
happy thoughts or make the president accept
them. Accurate information about the likely
postwar situation was available—it was either
discarded or ignored. Ideology, combined with
a healthy dose of wishful thinking and analyt-
ical bias, trumped expertise. 
Of course, it’s the president’s job to settle
these disputes and embrace the correct policy
before the time to act on them arrives. Bush
and his national security advisor, Condoleezza
Rice, failed in this regard, allowing plans for a
short occupation with few ambitions to dom-
inate until the occupation began, and then set-
tling on a longer occupation for which they
had not prepared. The president’s failure to
referee his subordinates, however, is not a
structural deficiency in the U.S. government
but a managerial deficiency in the Bush
administration. No amount of bureaucratic
rejiggering can make the president listen to
the right people.
Planning Is Not Power
The more important problem with the idea
that planning could have saved Iraq is that it
implies that proper organizational charts and
meetings can stabilize broken countries and
make order where there is none. This confuses
a process with a policy, a bureaucratic mecha-
nism with power. Planning solves engineering
problems. Upgrading electrical grids, extend-
ing modern sewerage, and rebuilding schools
and hospitals—these things are easily planned.
The management of foreign societies is anoth-
er matter altogether. 
It is impossible to label the post-invasion
civil strife in Iraq as inevitable or to claim
that things could not have gone better. But
even the wisest American leader, armed with
the best plans, would have struggled to
implant a liberal order in which the Iraqi peo-
ple would easily cooperate with one another
in a democratic state. There was not then and
is not now a plan sufficient to solve Iraq’s
fundamental problem—the lack of popular
support within Iraqi society for an equitable
division of power. People perceive that there
is a lot at stake, and many are willing to fight
to achieve their goals. 
As Aaron Wildavsky noted long ago, in gov-
ernment, planning is basically a synonym for
politics.47 That is, planning aims to control
future government decisions. But plans over
some government activity are the province of
all who have power over it, meaning that there
are lots of planners and a lot of plans, most
incompatible. When you build a house, there
is one set of plans. When you build a nation,
there are hundreds. And that is just in your
government. The trick in politics is not having
the right plans; it is having the power to imple-
ment them. And in societies our military occu-
pies, the power of the United States is severely
circumscribed.48 The problem in Iraq, seen in
this light, is that even if the United States gov-
ernment had aligned its own plans, various
factions had other plans, mostly competing.
And their conception of their interest so dif-
fered from America’s and each others’ that
there was no unity to be had. 
The experts who say more American plan-
ning would have saved Iraq confuse the power
to conquer foreign countries with the power
to run them. The military gives us the former
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power, but the latter is elusive. Even suppress-
ing political violence is far easier, and requires
far less control, than convincing people to
form a government and obey its laws. The
functioning of a modern state requires the
participation of millions of people who show
up for work, pay taxes, and so on. People do
these things because they believe in a national
idea that organizes the state or because they
are coerced. In attempting to build foreign
nations, the United States is unable to impose
a national idea and our liberalism, thankfully,
limits our willingness to run foreign states
through sheer terror. 
If the United States occupies a country
where the national identity is intact and sim-
ply assists in the management of its institu-
tions and in security, state-building may suc-
ceed. But success requires the cooperation of
the subject population or a goodly portion of
it. That is not something that we can create
through planning.
There is good evidence that the sectarian
differences in Iraq meant that such coopera-
tion was not salvageable after the American
invasion. As noted above, it appears that Iraq
was held together—but barely—by Saddam
Hussein’s brutal police-state tactics. Beneath
that penumbra of state terror were irreconcil-
able ambitions among Sunnis, Shiites, Kurds
and various groups therein. These differences
were likely to produce civil war in the absence
of their forced suppression. 
Note that this was the logic George H. W.
Bush and Dick Cheney cited as the reason they
did not overthrow Saddam Hussein after eject-
ing Iraq from Kuwait in 1991.49 Note also that
the Future of Iraq Project, often mentioned as
a guide to preventing Iraq’s implosion, actual-
ly shows why it was likely. Whatever their wis-
dom, the papers lacked an outline of a politi-
cal settlement among the Iraqis, something
that has also eluded the various Iraqi govern-
ments. 
The Bush administration sought ambitious
goals in Iraq—democracy and capitalism—but
even more modest objectives, such as creating
stability and a functional state amid warring
people, are usually beyond our capacity.
Foreign troops still police Kosovo’s ethnic
groups, and only physical separation keeps
them at peace where the troops are not.
Proponents of state-building like Condoleezza
Rice point to the post-World War II occupa-
tions of Germany and Japan as examples to
emulate.50 But those occupations relied on
conditions the U.S. military could not recreate
in Iraq: wars that shattered the fighting spirit
of the people, unified polities, and effective
bureaucratic institutions that are capable of
restoration. 
Coordination Is Illiberal 
Seeing U.S. government agencies fighting
and ignoring the wisdom others have offered,
Washington’s response these days is to pre-
scribe coordination. But this assumes that
the planners want the same thing. They do
not. Divergent plans are the product of diver-
gent preferences, which result from divided
power. A wish that agencies always march to
the same strategy ignores the fact the agen-
cies should and do have different goals, inter-
ests, and perspectives.51
The attempt to replicate Goldwater-Nichols
across national security agencies is based on the
idea that the highest end of government is
unity of effort—what the military calls joint-
ness—and that division and argument are the
enemies of good policy. But jointness is meant
to achieve victory in battle, not wise policy in
government. Intergovernmental contention,
even within the executive branch, is no accident.
Unity, we should not forget, was anathema to
the authors of the Constitution, who mistrust-
ed concentrations of power—even in foreign
affairs—and organized a government to bicker
and muddle through. 
Liberal government makes organizations
and the laws and regulations that govern them
to serve various ends, some competing. Our
government is divided because it is the arena
where the society’s competing ends contend.52
Bureaucratic disagreements help leaders
appreciate trade-offs and make wise choices.53
In fact, the Bush administration did achieve
jointness in its plans for the occupation—uni-
fying decisionmaking in the Department of
9
The experts 
who say more
American 
planning would
have saved Iraq
confuse the
power to conquer
foreign countries
with the power to
run them.
Defense —and because of the views of the pres-
ident and his appointees, the prevailing plans
were the most unrealistic ones. The problem
was not too little unity but too much.
The Counterinsurgency
Dodge
Another prominent explanation for the fail-
ure in Iraq is that the military, the army in par-
ticular, forgot how to fight insurgencies. As in
Vietnam, the U.S. military initially treated the
insurgency as a conventional foe and used
offensive, high-intensity operations, rather
than population defense, intelligence-gather-
ing, and politicking to combat it. The main les-
son that many army officers drew from
Vietnam was the bureaucratically convenient
notion that politicians should not be allowed to
limit wars. After the war, the army was eager to
forget counterinsurgency doctrine and mostly
did. The Marine Corps maintained a greater
commitment to small wars, but it too has kept
conventional conflict as its first priority.
This aversion to counterinsurgency brought
failure in Iraq, the logic goes. The army’s dis-
dain for occupation duties explains why Gen-
eral Franks paid so little attention to so-called
Phase IV operations. The notion that such
duties are not a military job explains not only
the reluctance to reestablish order after
Saddam fell, but the failure to secure weapons
depots—which supposedly contained the casus
belli, chemical and biological ordnance—allow-
ing insurgents to take all the guns and ammu-
nition they could haul.
The same problem prevented the army from
reacting skillfully to the insurgency. Once the
escalation of violence in 2003 forced the army
to admit that there was a popular Sunni revolt
rather than a few terrorists and dead-ender
Baathists, the reaction was predicable. Al-
though tactics varied by unit, the army essen-
tially treated the insurgency like a conventional
military foe. This approach amounted to send-
ing out patrols, sparking firefights where
American advantages in firepower would
obtain, and conducting sweeps to net bad guys,
who could then be interrogated for intelli-
gence.54 The result was that in the summer and
fall of 2003, the U.S. military crowded tens of
thousands of captives, many innocent, into
prisons such as Abu Ghraib to be interrogated,
often harshly. Most were subsequently released.
This pattern angered the Sunni population, dri-
ving it further into insurgent arms. Moreover,
having avoided preparation for counterinsur-
gency, the ground services were deficient in the
human assets needed to conduct it: officers
with expertise in such wars, Arabic speakers,
military police interrogators, and intelligence
officers schooled in the art of gathering infor-
mation from men rather than machines. 
Responding to these failures, several recent
reforms aim to improve American counterin-
surgency doctrine and capabilities. In Decem-
ber 2005, the Pentagon directed the services to
make stability operations a priority on par with
conventional war.55 Every service, even the navy,
which is only marginally involved in stability
operations, now heralds its commitment to
these missions. The army and Marines Corps
released a new joint counterinsurgency manual
in December 2006.56
Other proposals aim to improve the integra-
tion of civilians into counterinsurgency and sta-
bility operations. Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, for
instance, and several other reports suggest that
Congress create a reserve corps of civilians capa-
ble of leaving their jobs and being deployed to
help with state-building.57 Kurt Campbell and
Michael O’Hanlon recommend the creation of
“a quickly deployable” corps of “Diplomatic
Special Forces” with a “capability large enough
to coordinate an effort in a country the size of
Iraq or Afghanistan or even Congo.”58 The Iraq
Study Group proposes that Congress legislate
to allow agencies to force civilians to serve these
missions.59 The Defense Science Board endorses
Joint Interagency Coordination Groups, where
civilians are integrated into combatant com-
mands.60 President Bush endorsed these ideas in
the 2007 State of the Union address, calling for
the creation of a “Civilian Reserve Corps.”61
These changes will probably improve the
U.S. performance in counterinsurgency opera-
tions (COIN). If the military focuses on popu-
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lation protection, it will be less likely to use the
kind of excessive force that alienates people
and empowers insurgencies. Equally impor-
tant is the COIN manual’s focus on political
institutions and political reconciliation as the
key measure of success. But the manual’s
recognition of this problem merely points to
the limits of COIN doctrine. Outside authori-
ties often lack the power to solve the political
problems that cause insurgencies, whatever
their strategy. In Iraq, the problem is a dis-
agreement about the distribution of power
between Iraq’s groups. Overthrowing a regime
dominated by the Sunni and replacing it with
democracy meant empowering Shiites, so
insofar as Americans stood for democracy
they were likely to face a Sunni revolt. The
problem is one of mathematics more than
American doctrine. Without a competent cen-
tral state that the various Iraqi groups believed
in, counterinsurgency tactics could not assure
the survival of a unified Iraq.
One reason to doubt that Americans can
ever excel at counterinsurgency is that many
insurgencies present a foreign occupier with
nearly insurmountable hurdles. Unfamiliar
with local custom and language, Americans
have no independent ability to ferret out insur-
gents. For intelligence, Americans rely on for-
eign allies and civilian collaborators whom
insurgents threaten with death. Unable to
make comparable threats, the American occu-
pier can only bribe, but what bribe can outbid
the life the insurgent preserves? The popula-
tion will therefore often serve the insurgency
out of fear even if it does not believe in its
cause—and it often does. If the occupying force
sits on a town, it may suppress the insurgency,
but fighters will slip away or hide. The locals
will likely assume that someday the occupiers
are leaving and that insurgents will again con-
trol the streets. The population is therefore
unlikely to provide intelligence even where they
still have useful intelligence to give.62
A response to this difficulty is to flood the
country with troops, protect citizens, win their
allegiance and crush the insurgency with the
intelligence that is provided. As discussed, in
large countries, there will probably not be
enough troops to go around. A less manpow-
er-intensive solution is to form alliances with
local strongmen who might otherwise be
insurgents or aid them, as we see in Iraq’s
Anbar province, where U.S. forces allied with
Sunni tribesmen against Al Qaeda-oriented
militias, and in Afghanistan, where Americans
try to split warlords off from the Taliban. This
solution depends on having a common inter-
est with some powerful local actors. Such
common interests will not always exist or may
be too shallow to last. 
This is not to say that U.S. troops cannot
acquire useful intelligence from foreign popu-
lations—we gather plenty every day—or that
Americans can never suppress a foreign insur-
gency like Iraq’s. Nor is it true that American
military occupations will never be worthwhile.
Some insurgencies—those less entrenched in
their surroundings—are relatively easy for an
occupier to destroy. Still, there is no logical
reason—no law of politics—that makes even
the most powerful insurgencies impossible to
suppress. 
The problem with counterinsurgency
warfare is not that its theory of victory is
illogical. If you understand the culture, if you
avoid counterproductive violence, if you inte-
grate civilians and make reconstruction oper-
ations a reward for cooperation, if you train
the local forces well, if you pick your allies
wisely, if you protect enough civilians and
win their loyalty and more, you might suc-
ceed. But even avoiding a few of these ifs is
too much competence to expect of foreign
powers. That is why insurgencies in the last
century generally lasted for decades and why
the track record of democratic powers pacify-
ing uprisings in foreign lands is abysmal.63
The Empire Strikes Out
Another reason Americans will struggle to
master counterinsurgency doctrine is that it
requires a foreign policy at odds with our
national character. Reading through the pro-
posals for rapidly deployable bureaucrats to
help run failing states, one usually searches
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in vain for the pages where the author justi-
fies the creation of an empire and a colonial
service to run it.64 Whatever else changed
after September 11, America remains cultur-
ally unprepared for imperialism. We are ill-
suited for stabilizing disorderly states and
achieving success in protracted foreign wars. 
A wealth of resources and a dearth of labor
created an American military that has tradi-
tionally sought to replace labor with capital,
and to avoid casualties through firepower and
stand-off weapons. Geography left Americans
with a poor understanding of the nations we
might occupy. We also dislike mixing politics
and war, which creates a tendency to view war as
apolitical and its makers as immaculate techni-
cians, unsullied by the politics they serve.
Americans tend to see war as a substitute for
diplomacy, not its occasional agent.65 This
approach to war may have its origins in
America’s uniquely pure liberalism. Americans
dislike limited, non-ideological wars. We want
our wars to be conclusive, the ends clear, the
cause righteous, and the force decisive. We favor
offense over defense, for it is more decisive.
These conditions were spelled out in the
Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, Caspar Weinberg-
er and Colin Powell’s formula intended to help
avoid future Vietnams. The doctrine, articulat-
ed in the 1980s, called on leaders to prepare
overwhelming force, generate strong national
support, define clear objectives, and have a plan
for leaving, before using the military. 
These features of the American approach to
war militate against success in counterinsur-
gency and state building.66 Our parochialism
leaves us ignorant of the language and cultures
of populations that counterinsurgency cam-
paigns force us to woo. Technology and fire-
power have little utility in such operations,
which are manpower intensive. The insistence
on a rigid dichotomy between politics and war
and aversion to the limited use of force are
destructive to these especially political cam-
paigns, where force should be tightly controlled
by civilians. The protracted, defensive nature of
these wars muddies the public’s sense of pur-
pose.67 The pressure to use harsh tactics to gen-
erate intelligence offends our moral sense.
Whatever direction it receives from current
appointees, our military—with its rotation
schedules, discomfort with subordination to
diplomats and preference for firepower and
high technology weapons—will struggle to
overcome difficulties with stability operations.
Neither the State Department nor the U.S.
Agency for International Development (US-
AID), technically part of State, is built to
administer an empire. The department’s bud-
get is tiny because its aim is to relate to foreign
nations, not to run them. 
National security organizations are formed
by decades of budgets and decisions. Their
organizational politics may be unfavorable to
a current conception about what American
security requires. But these politics reflect
more lasting national interests, namely a dis-
inclination to subjugate foreign peoples and
lose unnecessary wars. That disinclination is
not simply accidental but rather derives from
the lessons of history that Americans have
institutionalized. Americans have historically
looked askance at the small wars European
powers fought to maintain their imperial
holdings, viewing those actions as illiberal and
unjust. Misadventures like Vietnam are the
exceptions that make the rule. It is no accident
that U.S. national security organizations are
not designed for occupation duties. When it
comes to nation building, brokering civil and
ethnic conflict, and waging counterinsur-
gency, we are our own worst enemy, and that is
a sign of our lingering common sense.
The final reason that Americans will not
master counterinsurgency and state-building
is that we do not have to. Winning small wars
has never been essential to American security.
That remains the case today. In fact, the
attempt to establish control of hostile soci-
eties is a source of insecurity.
Today both political parties seem to agree
that the war on terrorism requires an empire.
Even though they avoid the term, they embrace
the same neoimperial logic with different
twists. The common claim is that terrorists
organize and train in places where government
authority is limited, like the Taliban’s Afghan-
istan. To prevent this outcome, the conven-
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tional wisdom goes, the United States needs
the ability to prop up authority abroad or to
resurrect it from chaos. That requires boots on
the ground, civilians to help run foreign gov-
ernments, and flexible plans for occupation
duties in various cultures and climes. A related
idea says that finding terrorists requires intelli-
gence, which in turn requires winning hearts
and minds, and therefore the United States has
to find a way to win the entire Muslim world’s
allegiance to defeat terrorism. We must wage,
in effect, a “global counterinsurgency.”68
These ideas conflate counterterrorism with
counterinsurgency, burdening a task we can
accomplish with one we cannot. Counterter-
rorism is best accomplished by police, intelli-
gence operatives, and special operations forces.
We can hunt and capture or kill the small
minority of jihadists who seek to attack
Americans (themselves a small minority of the
violent Islamists) but we need not establish
control over foreign states in order to do so.
Nor do Americans need popular support
abroad to get the intelligence needed to hunt
terrorists. Other governments that we ally with
do. For example, the snatch-and-grab opera-
tions that netted Ramzi bin al-Shibh and
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed relied on timely
intelligence and cooperation with Pakistani
officials.69 They were not part of a wider cam-
paign to reshape the political and social order
in Rawalpindi or Karachi, respectively. 
Boots on the ground are needed in rare
cases like Afghanistan to root out terrorist
sanctuaries, but, in general, military occupa-
tions undermine counterterrorism efforts.
They produce rage and resistance that creates
enemies and validates the jihadist propagan-
da that America is at war with Islam.70
Occupations convert extremists who would
otherwise concern themselves with resisting
their own governments into international ter-
rorists interested in killing Americans. 
Conclusion
History is awash in failed states, but only a
handful have posed a serious problem for
American security.71 A few civil wars have given
impetus to jihadism, but it does not follow
that the United States should join those con-
flicts, even in the Middle East. The principal
interest the United States has in lawless states
is to prevent a government from taking power
that will give refuge to terrorists aiming to
attack our country. The states where such con-
cerns are valid are few. Afghanistan and Iraq
are exceptions, not the harbingers of a new
reality. American actions since September 11
should deter governments who might be
tempted to make common cause with anti-
American terrorists. Preventing terrorists from
gaining sanctuary in weak states does not
require that we reinvent our state. We can
accomplish the same goals at considerably
lower cost through combinations of local
allies, intelligence, air strikes, ground raids,
and threat of retaliation. 
The best way to promote American securi-
ty is restraint—a wise and masterly inactivity
in the face of most foreign disorder. We
should resurrect the notion that the best way
to spread democracy is to model it. Our ide-
ology sells itself, especially when it is not
introduced at gunpoint or during a lecture to
the natives instructing them on how they
ought to run their country. Likewise, in the
long term, unplanned free trade and the
wealth it brings may do more to promote sta-
bility abroad than the most careful planning.
The assertion of raw U.S. power in foreign
countries tends to unify our enemies and
weaken our ideological allies.
The lessons drawn from the war in Iraq
should include caution about the limits of our
power in remaking states. Iraq should not
become a laboratory to perfect the process of
doing so. The fetish for planning, interagency
cooperation and counterinsurgency might
produce some worthwhile changes in our
national security establishment, but it also
might grease our slide into an imperial era
foolishly foisted on Americans in the name of
security. Learning the right lessons from our
experience in Iraq should convince Americans
that preserving our power sometimes requires
restraining it.
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